SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright 2020 n2n contributors
SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright Hamish Coleman

# Cryptography in n3n

## Payload

### Overview

Payload encryption currently comes in four different flavors using ciphers of different origins. Supported ciphers are enabled using the indicated command line option:

- Twofish in CTS mode (`-Ocommunity.cipher=Twofish`)
- AES in CBC mode (`-Ocommunity.cipher=AES`)
- ChaCha20 (CTR) (`-Ocommunity.cipher=ChaCha20`)
- SPECK in CTR mode (`-Ocommunity.cipher=Speck`)

The following chart might help to make a quick comparison and decide what cipher to use:

| Cipher | Mode | Block Size | Key Size         | IV length |Speed | Built-In | Origin |
| :---:  | :---:| :---:      | :---:            | :---:     |:---: | :---:    | ---    |
|Twofish | CTS  | 128 bits   | 256 bit          | 128 bit   | -..O | Y        | Bruce Schneier |
|AES     | CTS  | 128 bits   | 128, 192, 256 bit| 128 bit   | O..+ | Y        | Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, NSA-approved |
|ChaCha20| CTR  | Stream     | 256 bit          | 128 bit   | +..++| Y        | Daniel J. Bernstein |
|SPECK   | CTR  | Stream     | 256 bit          | 128 bit   | ++   | Y        | NSA |

The two block ciphers Twofish and AES are used in CTS mode.

n3n has all four ciphers built-in as basic versions. Some of them optionally
compile to faster versions by the means of available hardware support (AES-NI,
SSE, AVX – please see the [Building document](../build/index.md) for
details. Depending on your platform, AES and ChaCha20 might also draw notable
acceleration from optionally compiling with openSSL 1.1 support.

The`-k <key>` command line parameter supplies the key. As even non-privileged
users might get to see the command line parameters (try `ps -Af | grep edge`),
the key can also be supplied through the `N3N_KEY` environment variable: `sudo
N3N_KEY=mysecretpass edge start -c mynetwork -a 192.168.100.1 -l
supernode.ntop.org:7777`.

Providing a key (with a community.key option) without specifying any cipher
(with a community.cipher` option) will default to AES encryption.

To renounce encryption, `community.cipher=null` enables the so called
`null_transform` transmitting all payload data unencryptedly. Omitting any
cipher option and not providing a key through `-k <key>` has the same effect.

### Twofish

This implementation prepends a 128 bit random value to the plain text. Its size is adjustable by changing the `TF_PREAMBLE_SIZE` definition found in `src/transform_tf.c`. It defaults to TF_BLOCK_SIZE (== 16). As CTS uses underlying CBC mode, this basically has the same effect as a respectively shorter IV. However, this flexibility does not come for free as an additional block needs to be encrypted.

Twofish requires no padding as it employs a CBC/CTS scheme which can send out plaintext-length ciphertexts. The scheme however has a small flaw in handling messages shorter than one block, only low-level programmer might encounter this.

On Intel CPUs, Twofish usually is the slowest of the ciphers present. However,
on Raspberry Pi 3B+, Twofish was observed to be faster than AES-CTS. Your
mileage may vary. Cipher speed's can be compared running the
`n3n-edge test benchmark` tool.

### AES

AES also prepends a random value to the plaintext. Its size is adjustable by changing the `AES_PREAMBLE_SIZE` definition found in `src/transform_aes.c`. It defaults to AES_BLOCK_SIZE (== 16). The AES scheme uses a CBC/CTS scheme which can send out plaintext-length ciphertexts as long as they are one block or more in length.

Apart from n3n's plain C implementation, Intel's AES-NI is supported – again,
please have a look at the [Building document](../build/index.md). In case
of openSSL support its `evp_*` interface gets used which also offers hardware
acceleration where available (SSE, AES-NI, …). It however is slower than the
following stream ciphers because the CBC mode cannot compete with the
optimized stream ciphers.

This cipher's different key-sizes are triggered by the length of the user-provided key: 22 characters or less make n3n use AES-128, between 23 and 32 characters lead to AES-192, and 33 or more characters trigger AES-256.

### ChaCha20

ChaCha20 was the first stream cipher supported by n3n.

In addition to the basic C implementation, an SSE version is offered. If compiled with openSSL support, ChaCha20 is provided via the `evp_*` interface. It is not used together with the Poly1305 message tag from the same author though. Whole packet's checksum will be handled in the header (see below).

The random full 128-bit IV is transmitted in plain.

ChaCha20 usually performs faster than AES-CTS.

### SPECK

SPECK is recommended by the NSA for offical use in case AES implementation is not feasible due to system constraints (performance, size, …). The block cipher is used in CTR mode making it a stream cipher. The random full 128-bit IV is transmitted in plain.

On modern Intel CPUs, SPECK performs even faster than openSSL's ChaCha20 as it takes advantage of SSE4, AVX2, or AVX512 if available. On Raspberry's ARM CPU, it is second place behind ChaCha20 and before Twofish.

### Random Numbers

Throughout n3n, pseudo-random numbers are generated for several purposes, e.g. random MAC assignment and the IVs for use with the various ciphers. Regarding IVs, especially for using in the stream ciphers, the pseudo-random numbers shall be as collision-free as possible. n3n uses an implementation of XORSHIFT128+ which shows a periodicity of 2¹²⁸.

Its initialization relies on seeding with a value as random as possible. Various sources are tapped including a syscall to Linux' `SYS_getrandom` as well as Intels hardware random number generators `RDRND` and `RDSEED`, if available (compile using `-march=native`).

### Pearson Block Hashing

For general purpose hashing, n3n employs [Pearson Block Hashing](https://github.com/Logan007/pearsonB) as it offers variable hash sizes and is said not to be too "collidy". However, this is not a cryptographically secure hashing function which by the way is not required here: The hashing is never applied in a way that the hash value shall publicly prove the knowledge of a secret without showing the secret itself.

_Pearson hashing is tweakable by using your own block-sized permutation._ Here, we use a three-round xor-rotate-multiply permutation scheme on 64-bit wide integer numbers with constants discovered by [David Stafford](http://zimbry.blogspot.com/2011/09/better-bit-mixing-improving-on.html) (`mix13`, permission obtained via eMail) which, meanwhile, is better known as part of `splitmix64()`.

_Pearson hashing allows verification of block-sized parts of the hash only – just in case performance requirements would urge to do so._

## Header

### Overview

Packet's header consist of a COMMON section followed by a packet-type specific section, e.g. REGISTER, REGISTER_ACK, PACKET including the payload, REGISTER_SUPER, …

The COMMON section is built as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! Version = 3   ! TTL           ! Flags                         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 4 ! Community ...                                                 :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 8 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
12 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
16 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
20 ! ... Community                                                 !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

In case of a PACKET-type, it is succeeded by the fields depicted below:

```
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
24 ! Source MAC Address                                            :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
28 :                               ! Destination MAC Address       :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
32 :                                                               !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
36 ! Socket Flags (v=IPv4)         ! Destination UDP Port          !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
40 ! Destination IPv4 Address                                      !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
44 ! Compress'n ID !  Transform ID ! Payload ...                   !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
48 !                                                               !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+...
```

### Encryption

If enabled (`community.header_encryption=true`), all fields but the payload
(which is handled separately as outlined above) get encrypted using SPECK in
CTR mode. As packet headers need to be decryptable by the supernode and we do
not want to add another key (to keep it a simple interface), the community name
serves as key (keep it secret!) because it is already known to the supernode.
The community name consists of up to 20 characters (well, 19 + `0x00`), so key
size of 128 bit is a reasonable choice here.

The scheme applied tries to maintain compatibility with current packet format and works as follows:

- First line of 4 bytes (Version, TTL, Flags) goes to sixth line:

```
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! Community ...                                                 :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 4 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 8 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
12 ! ... Community ...                                             :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
16 ! ... Community                                                 !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
20 ! Version = 3   ! TTL           ! Flags                         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```
- To be able to identify a correctly decrpyted header later on, a magic number is stamped in fifth line starting at byte number 16. We use "n2" string and add the 16-bit header length to be able to stop header decryption right before an eventually following ethernet data payload begins – in case of PACKET-type, header-length does not equal packet-length. 16-bit length is required because REGISTER_SUPER_ACK packets consist of header only and could grow quite large due to their payload (other supernodes of federation) – don't mix up this kind of payload (part of the header) with the ethernet data payload of PACKET messages.

- The rest of the community field, namely the first 16 bytes, is reframed towards a 128-bit IV for the header encryption.

```
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! IV ...                                                        :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 4 ! ... IV ...                                                    :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 8 ! ... IV ...                                                    :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
12 ! ... IV                                                        !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
16 ! Magic Number "n2" = 0x6E32    ! Header Length                 !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
20 ! Version = 3   ! TTL           ! Flags                         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

- As we use a stream cipher, the IV should be a nonce. The IV plays an additional role sketched later, see the following sections on checksum and replay protection.

- To make a less predictable use of the key space – just think of the typically reset MSB of ASCII characters of community names – we actually use a hash of the community name as key.

- Encryption starts at byte number 16 and ends at header's end. It does not comprise PACKET's ethernet data payload which eventually has its own encryption scheme as chosen with the `-A_` options.

Decryption checks all known communities (several in case of supernode, only one at edge) as keys. On success, the emerging magic number along with a reasonable header's length value will reveal the correct community whose name will be copied back to the original fields allowing for regular packet handling.

Thus, header encryption will only work with previously determined community
names introduced to the supernode by the `supernode.community_file` option.
Also, it should be clear that header encryption is a per-community decision,
i.e. all nodes and the supernode need to have it enabled. However, the
supernode supports encrypted and unencrypted communities in parallel, it
determines their status online at arrival of the first packet. Use a fresh
community name for encrypted communities; do not use a previously used one of
former unecrypted communities: their names were transmitted openly.

### Checksum

The whole packet including the eventually present payload is checksummed using a Pearson block hashing scheme. The 64-bit checksum is exclusive-ored with a (shifted by 32 bit) 64-bit time stamp and filled up with 32 more random bits to obtain a 128-bit pre-IV. This pre-IV gets encrypted using a single block-cipher step to get the pseudo-random looking IV. This way, the checksum resists targeted bit-flips (to header, payload, and IV) as any change to the whole 128-bit IV would render the header un-decryptable. Also, as explained below, the checksum comes along with a time stamp minimizing opportunities for random attacks.

The single block-cipher step employs SPECK because it is quite fast and it offers a 128-bit block cipher version. The key is derived from the header key – a hash of the hash.

The checksum is calculated by the edges and the supernode. Changes to the payload will cause a different locally calculated checksum. Extracting the time stamp by exclusive-oring an erroneous checksum will lead to an invalid timestamp. So, checksum errors are indirectly detected when checking for a valid time stamp.

### Replay Protection

The aforementioned 128-bit pre-IV can be depicted as follows:

```
    01234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   ! 64-bit checksum of the whole packet                            ! 0x00                          !                               !
   + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XOR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -! 32 pseudo-random bits         !
   ! 0x00                          ! 52-bit time stamp with microsecond-accuracy       ! countr ! F !                               !
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+

```

The time stamp consists of the 52-bit microsecond value, an 8-bit counter in case of equal following time stamps and, a 4-bit flag field F (accuracy indicator in last bit). edge and supernode monitor their own time stamps for doublets which would indicate an accuracy issue. If the counter overflows on the same time stamp, the sub-second part of the time stamp will also become counter. In this case, the whole stamp carries the accuracy bit flag (lowest bit) set so other edges and supernodes can handle this stamp appropriately.

Encrypting this pre-IV using a block cipher step will generate a pseudo-random looking IV which gets written to the packet and used for the header encryption.

Due to the time-stamp encoded, the IV will more likely be unique, close to a real nonce.

Upon receival, the time stamp as well as the checksum can be extracted from the IV by performing a 128-bit block-cipher decryption step. Verification of the time stamp happens in two steps:

- The (remote) time stamp is checked against the local clock. It may not deviate more than plus/minus 16 seconds. So, edges and supernode need to keep a somewhat current time. This limit can be adjusted by changing the `TIME_STAMP_FRAME` definition. It is time-zone indifferent as UTC is used.

- Valid (remote) time stamps get stored as "last valid time stamp" seen from each node (supernode and edges). So, a newly arriving packet's time stamp can be compared to the last valid one. It should be equal or higher. However, as UDP packets may overtake each other just by taking another path through the internet, they are allowed to be 160 millisecond earlier than the last valid one. This limit is set with the `TIME_STAMP_JITTER` definition. If the accuracy flag is set, the time stamp will be allowed a jitter eight times as high, corresponding to 1.25 seconds by default.

- However, the systemic packets such as REGISTER_SUPER are not allowed any time stamp jitter because n3n relies on the actual sender's socket. A replay from another IP within any allowed jitter time frame would deviate the traffic which shall be prevented (even if it remains undecryptable). Under absolutely rare (!) circumstances, this might cause a re-registration requirement which happens automatically but might cause a small delay – security (including network availability) first! REGISTER packets from the local multicast environment are exempt from the very strict no-jitter requirement because they indeed regularly can show some deviation if compared to time stamps in packets received on the regular socket. As these packets are incoming on different sockets, their processing is more likely to not take place in the order these packets were sent.

The way the IV is used for replay protection and for checksumming makes enabled header encryption a prerequisite for these features.
